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INTRODUCTION 
The Hatch-Waxman amendments1 were enacted by Congress 
in 1984 to ease the introduction of generic drugs into the market.2  
Since their enactment, the Hatch-Waxman amendments have 
stimulated a thriving generic drug industry and greatly improved 
access of lower cost drugs in the pharmaceutical marketplace.3  
The generic drug industry segment is now an essential and 
indispensable part of the U.S. and international pharmaceutical 
industry.4  The Hatch-Waxman amendments provide for 
administrative procedures to streamline the approval of generic 
drug products, but certain aspects of the Hatch-Waxman 
amendments have created antitrust implications.  This paper will 
discuss antitrust aspects of the most recent changes to the Hatch-
Waxman amendments, in the “Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003” (hereinafter, the 
“Medicare Modernization Act” or “MMA”), enacted December 8, 
2003,5 which included the “Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals” 
Act (“AAPA”).6
The AAPA amendments introduced significant modifications 
affecting the 180-day term of exclusivity given to first challenger 
of a listed patent, the 30-month stay of approval, as well as other 
changes to the Hatch-Waxman amendments.7  The AAPA also 
contains a provision requiring notification of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) for 
agreements between generic and innovator drug companies.8
 1 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). See Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 
1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003), for a general discussion of the Hatch-Waxman amendments. 
 2 See generally A. Maureen Rouhi, Beyond Hatch-Waxman, Legislative Action Seeks 
To Close Loopholes In U.S. Law That Delay Entry Of Generics Into The Market, 80 (38) 
CHEM. ENGR. NEWS 53–59 (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/ 
coverstory/8038/8038biogenerics2.html.  See also Anne Field, Doctoring the Hatch-
Waxman Act (Aug. 2003), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/pubpolicy_bulow_ 
hatchwaxman_act.shtml (last visited July 29, 2006). 
 3 Rouhi, supra note 2. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2065 (2003). 
 6 Id. at 2448–64 (Title XI of the MMA, subtitles A and B)). 
 7 Id. (These provisions are in Title XI subtitle A of the MMA). 
 8 Id. (These provisions are in Title XI subtitle B of the MMA). 
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The patent laws have long engendered antitrust implications.  
The Hatch-Waxman amendments and AAPA modifications, 
because they affect patent rights, also invite a review of antitrust 
issues in light of the latest statutory scheme.  This paper will 
summarize the Hatch-Waxman amendments and the AAPA 
amendments, and will discuss antitrust aspects of the Hatch-
Waxman amendments.  Several recent relevant cases addressing 
antitrust aspects of generic drug approvals are reviewed.  The 
balancing of rights between the three principal market participants, 
patentee and New Drug Application (NDA) holders, generic 
market entrants, and the public, will be discussed from an antitrust 
perspective.  Finally, future antitrust implications under the 2003 
Act will be considered, with particular reference to the forfeiture 
provisions in the MMA.  This paper concludes that the MMA 
amendments will cause substantial harm to the generic drug 
companies, more than they will aid the NDA holders, but that the 
greatest damage will be to the public, which will likely experience 
marketing delays in the introduction of lower cost drugs, because 
of reduced innovation in generic drug development. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS 
The overarching objective of generic drug development is to 
produce lower cost copies of marketed and effective drugs.9  The 
rules pertaining to drug approvals generally are codified in the 
“Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act” (“FDCA”), at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 
et. seq. (2000).10  The Hatch-Waxman amendments provide for an 
“Abbreviated New Drug Application” (“ANDA”),11 which allows 
a generic drug company to rely on the clinical data of the innovator 
 9 For general reviews of the Hatch-Waxman Act and related history, see Laba Karki, 
Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals: The Hatch-Waxman Act, Regulatory 
Amendments and Implications for Drug Patent Enforcement, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 602 (2005) and Erika King Leitzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287 (2004). 
 10 See Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 11 See id.  The ANDA provisions are discussed in § 505(j) of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000).  There are also some aspects in the 
patent laws. See Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1245. 
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company.  Innovator companies file a “New Drug Application” 
(“NDA”),12 which requires, inter alia, toxicological and clinical 
data demonstrating safety and effectiveness.  A generic drug 
company seeking to copy an innovator drug only has to show 
“bioequivalence” to gain approval for a generic drug ANDA.13
The Hatch-Waxman amendments provide for a system of 
patent listings for approved drugs listed under § 505(b) of the 
FDCA,14 covering the drug product, method of use, and 
formulations.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
maintains this patent listing as part of the database “Approved 
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” 
commonly referred to as the “Orange Book.”15
Generic companies seeking to copy a listed drug must certify 
one of four statements concerning the patents on a listed drug: (i) 
the listed drug is not patented (a “paragraph I certification”); (ii) 
the listed drug’s patent has expired (a “paragraph II certification”); 
(iii) the generic drug will be marketed after the expiration date of 
the listed drug’s patent (a “paragraph III certification”); or (iv)  the 
listed drug’s patent “is invalid or . . . it will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug” covered by the ANDA 
(a “paragraph IV certification”).16  In addition to the four patent 
certifications, there is an additional provision in that the listed 
patent covers an indication for which the drug is not approved.17  
Most of the interesting features of generic drugs, as will be 
explained in more detail in this paper, involve the paragraph IV 
certification process. 
 12 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2000). 
 13 See Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1244 for a description of bioequivalence.  Bioequivalence 
generally means that the extent and rate of absorption of the generic drug are not 
significantly different from that of the innovator drug.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B)(i). 
 14 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2000). 
 15 Available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/.  For general discussions of patent listings 
in the Orange Book, see the faq’s on the Orange Book web site, and also 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/smallbiz/generic_exclusivity.htm, and http://www.fda.gov 
/cder/guidance/2576fnl.pdf. 
 16 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV) (2000).  See Bayer AG, supra note 10 at 1244–
45. 
 17 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii ) (2000).  See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 
316 F.3d 1348, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
BERKSFINALEDIT_091706_CLEAN 9/17/2006  5:41:05 PM 
2006] GENERICS INCENTIVES OUT THE WINDOW 1309 
 
If an ANDA is certified under paragraph IV, the applicant must 
notify the patent’s owner of the certification following a notice 
from the FDA that the application was accepted.18  This 
notification is essentially an invitation to be sued.  A paragraph IV 
certification is deemed to be an act of patent infringement “if the 
purpose of such a submission is to obtain approval under the 
[FDCA] to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a 
drug . . . claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a 
patent before the expiration of such a patent.”19
If a listed drug’s patent owner brings suit for patent 
infringement within 45 days of receiving the notice of a paragraph 
IV certification, then the ANDA is not approvable until the date a 
court determines invalidity or non-infringement, the date the patent 
expires, or 30 months from the date the patent holder receives 
notice of the ANDA paragraph IV certification (subject to judicial 
discretion), whichever occurs first.20  This is the so-called “30 
month stay” provision. 
As an incentive for generic companies to challenge patents, the 
first ANDA applicant to file a paragraph IV certification is entitled 
to 180 days of exclusivity before another ANDA can be approved 
by the FDA.21  This is the so-called “First to File” provision.  The 
180-day exclusivity period begins on the start of the actual sale of 
the drug, rather than the date the FDA approves the ANDA.22
Parts of the Hatch-Waxman amendments are also in the patent 
laws.  As a quid pro quo to the relative ease of challenging listed 
patents and the exclusivity period afforded to generic drug 
companies making paragraph IV certifications, the innovator 
companies are entitled to a patent term extension on one patent per 
drug product to compensate for regulatory delays in the approval 
process.23  Thus, the term of a patent which claims a product, a 
 18 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (superseded 2000).  See also 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.52, 314.94. 
 19 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000). 
 20 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  See Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., 324 F.3d 1322, 
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 21 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).  See also Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 
1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  For a general discussion of the 180-day exclusivity 
provision, see http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/smallbiz/generic_exclusivity.htm. 
 22 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000). 
 23 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000). 
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method of use, or a manufacturing process of a product that is 
subject to regulatory approval can be extended for up to five 
years,24 with a maximum term extension following approval of 14 
years.25
Additionally, Congress legislatively overruled Roche v. Bolar26 
and provided that it shall not be an act of infringement to make and 
test a patented drug solely for the uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information for an Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA).27
II. AAPA MODIFICATIONS TO HATCH-WAXMAN 
In 2002 and 2003, the Federal Trade Commission  
published a pair of studies containing significant criticisms 
regarding generic drug approvals and the conduct of drug 
companies around Hatch-Waxman issues.28  Both innovator 
companies and generic companies were accused of “gaming” the 
system to their advantage.29  The major manipulations were NDA 
holder strategies to obtain multiple 30 month stays delaying 
ANDA approvals, by layering patent additions to the Orange 
Book,30 and strategies by ANDA applicants and innovator drug 
 24 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A) (2000).  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 2758 (8th ed. 2005). 
 25 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3) (2000).  Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1551 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996). 
 26 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984). 
 27 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).  Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 
2380 (2005). 
 28 FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC 
STUDY (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf 
[hereinafter FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE 
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, 
(2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC, 
INNOVATION STUDY]. 
 29 FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at ch. 3, p. 13.  See also 149 CONG. REC. 
S8188 (daily ed. June 19, 2003).  One of the more spectacular episodes leading to the 
FTC investigation involved the attempts by Bristol-Myers Squibb to fend off generic 
competition for buspirone. See FED. TRADE COMM’N., IN THE MATTER OF BRISTOL-MYERS 
SQUIBB COMPANY (2003) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyers 
analysis.htm, in the section discussing BuSpar [hereinafter FTC, Bristol-Myers Squibb]. 
 30 FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at ii. 
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companies to delay the start of the 180-day exclusivity.31  By 
failing to market generics timely, generic manufacturers could 
delay the 180-day exclusivity to a time of their choosing, delaying 
the introduction of a generic drug to the marketplace and delaying 
the introduction of other generic competitors.32
The Generic Drug Study33 made two major recommendations: 
that innovator drugs should be limited to one 30-month stay per 
drug,34 and that innovator and generic drug companies should be 
required to file certain agreements with the FTC.35  The discussion 
of the latter recommendation largely centers around the 180-day 
marketing exclusivity provision, because there were a number of 
cases where innovator and generic companies made deals affecting 
the exclusivity period.36
Congress made drug reform a priority in 2003 and both the 
House and Senate passed bills H.R. 1 and S. 1.  The final MMA 
legislation was enacted on December 8, 2003.37  One key goal of 
the legislation was to reform prescription drug benefits for 
Medicare patients,38 but Title XI of the Act, the AAPA, made 
substantial changes to the Hatch-Waxman provisions as well.  
Paragraph 5 of 21 U.S.C § 355(j), which covers most of the issues 
pertaining to paragraph IV certifications, was essentially 
completely rewritten, a new paragraph 5 was added to the patent 
 31 Id. at vii. 
 32 Id. at 57.  Since the 180-day exclusivity clock does not start until the first to file 
generic drug company commences marketing of a generic drug, a failure to market 
prevents the approval of any other ANDA for that drug. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at Exec. Summary, p. ii 
 35 Id. at iv. 
 36 Id. at vii. 
 37 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, & Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
 38 See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE MODERNIZATION 
ACT, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/liheap/guidance/information_ 
memoranda/im05-16.html (last visited July 28, 2006) (noting that the purpose of the 
MMA is to bring “more affordable health care, prescription drug coverage to all people 
with Medicare, expanded health plan options, improved health care access for rural 
Americans, and preventive care services, such as flu shots and mammograms.”). See also 
Medicare Modernization Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES: 
HEALTHFINDER, http://www.healthfinder.gov/docs/doc09265.htm (last visited July 5, 
2006). 
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laws at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), and several other provisions were 
modified. 
Under the AAPA amendments, the 30-month stay provision 
was modified to explicitly allow only a single stay for any drug.39  
This was accomplished by inserting language into the statute that 
an action for infringement under the Hatch-Waxman provisions 
can only be brought for patents listed prior to the filing of the 
ANDA.40  The previous law had no similar limitation, and the 
innovator drug companies used this to their advantage by listing 
patents after an ANDA was filed, which permitted a separate stay 
for each listed patent.  Thus, NDA holders could delay generic 
entry with layered patents, and additional infringement suits that 
would trigger multiple 30-month stays.41  According to the 
Generic Drug Study, this happened eight times between 1992 and 
2000, with an additional stay beyond the first 30-month stay of 4–
40 months.42
The AAPA amendments provided a new set of forfeiture 
events, affecting the 180-day exclusivity.  An ANDA applicant 
must now market the drug on the earlier of either 75 days after 
approval or 30 months after submission, or within 75 days of a 
decision from a court from which no appeal can be taken, or a 
settlement with a finding that the patent is invalid or not infringed, 
or else the exclusivity is forfeited.43
Agreements between drug companies, either between innovator 
and generic or between generic and generic, must be reported to 
the FTC and the Attorney General.44
 39 See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY LISTED 
DRUGS, 30-MONTH STAYS, & APPROVAL OF ANDAS AND 505(B)(2) APPLICATIONS UNDER 
HATCH-WAXMAN, AS AMENDED BY THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT & 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 QUESTIONS & ANSWERS, available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
cder/guidance/6174dft.htm (discussing FDA Guidance on MMA changes to the Hatch-
Waxman amendments). 
 40 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (superseded 2003). 
 41 FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 48. 
 42 Id., passim (Table 4-3 lists drug stays extended beyond 30 months). 
 43 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(D) (superseded 2003). 
 44 Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement & Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, §§ 1111–1118, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461 (2003). 
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ANDA applicants, when filing paragraph IV certifications, 
must now notify the NDA holder within 20 days of the acceptance 
of filing by the FDA.  Previously, there was no express time limit 
on when the NDA holder had to be notified.45
The particulars of a civil action to obtain patent certainty, 
where a paragraph IV certification is made and the NDA holder 
does not sue the generic applicant within the 45-day notice period, 
are now more substantially spelled out.46  The pre-MMA statute47 
expressly allowed for the filing of an action for a declaratory 
judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.  The major substantive change 
is that the ANDA applicant must offer confidential access to the 
ANDA to help the NDA holder in deciding if there is actionable 
infringement.48  Presumably, this is intended to encourage suits or 
settlements between the parties. 
The new law provides for a counterclaim to an infringement 
action claiming that a patent was improperly listed because the 
patent does not claim the approved drug product or an approved 
method of using the drug.49
In a sense, there was a quid pro quo in the MMA, in that there 
was one factor strongly in favor of generic companies—the single 
30-month stay change—and another factor presumed to be in favor 
of the NDA holders—the exclusivity forfeiture provisions.  As will 
be seen, this Note suggests that the exclusivity forfeiture 
provisions in the MMA will likely damage most of the exclusivity 
awards for the generic drug companies.  This will harm incentives 
for the generic drug companies more than it will help the innovator 
 45 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (superseded 2003). 
 46 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(C) (superseded 2003). 
 47 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(III) (repealed 2003) 
 48 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(III) (superseded 2003). 
 49 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii) (superseded 2003).  There is also an administrative 
procedure for listing a patent in the Orange Book, under 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f), which 
permits anyone to petition the FDA that a patent was improperly listed.  However, the 
FDA does not independently evaluate the patent information listed.  The FDA will only 
request that the entity that listed the patent make the correction.  See also FTC, Generic 
Drug Study, supra note 28, at 45 (“Box 4-2 Private Parties Have No Right to Seek the 
Delisting of a Patent in the Orange Book”) (discussing the attempts by Mylan to have a 
buspirone patent listed.). 
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companies or consumers, and more than the single 30-month stay 
will help the generic companies. 
III. ANTITRUST ISSUES AROUND HATCH-WAXMAN 
In many respects, the goals of antitrust and patent law seem to 
conflict.50  Patent holders are afforded a twenty year monopoly by 
statute, based on the Constitutional authorization in Section 8 of 
Article I, on inventions examined by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office that meet patentability criteria.  On the other 
hand, the goal of antitrust is to promote competition and limit 
monopolies that can be unfair to consumers and competitors.51  
However, these competing objectives are not necessarily or 
inherently in conflict, and in some ways are complimentary.52  As 
Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes explain in their book The 
Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook, intellectual property 
law and antitrust law are often perceived as conflicting, because 
intellectual property fosters the creation of market power and 
antitrust responds to market power abuses.53  However, antitrust 
and intellectual property are more often complementary, because 
both systems advance consumer welfare resulting from efficient 
resource allocation, innovation, and technological progress.54  
Patents are recognized as playing a major role in innovation and 
benefits to consumers.55  However, antitrust violations can occur, 
for example when patentees attempt to extend their legal monopoly 
beyond that which is permitted by patent law.56
 50 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: 
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK, (West Group 2000), §§ 15.1, 15.3, p. 800, 813–15; 
Christine S. Paine, Brand-Name Manufacturers Risk Antitrust Violations By Slowing 
Generic Production Through Patent Layering, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 479, 479–80 
(2003); FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at Exec. Summary, pp. 2–3. 
 51 See Paine, supra note 50. 
 52 See FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at Exec. Summary, pp. 2–3. 
 53 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 50, at 800–01. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at Exec. Summary, pp. 2–3. 
 56 See infra notes 88–118 and accompanying text (discussing Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003) (Terazosin II)); infra notes 169–208 
and accompanying text (discussing Schering and Upsher). 
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The main impetus behind the AAPA, the abuses of the 30-
month stay and the 180-day exclusivity provisions, can be 
analyzed in terms of antitrust law.  The 30-month stay can raise 
questions of illegal monopolization, where attempts to extend the 
patent grant are questionable on antitrust grounds, as possible 
violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.57  Additionally, the 
manipulations of the 180-day exclusivity period can raise questions 
of collusion between the generic manufacturers and the innovator 
drug companies, which are potential violations of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act,58 because these cases often involve agreements 
between the generic and innovator companies.59
The 30-month stay period has been used in attempts to extend a 
patent monopoly that would otherwise expire, and therefore 
layering 30-month stays can raise antitrust concerns as illegal 
attempts to monopolize.60  The 30-month stay was established to 
give the generic applicant and NDA holder the opportunity to 
resolve patent issues prior to commercial marketing.61  The 30-
month stay is invoked if the NDA holder sues the generic applicant 
within 45 days of being notified of the ANDA filing with a 
paragraph IV certification.62  During this time, the FDA will not 
give final, marketing approval to the ANDA, unless the patent 
expires or there is a court decision that the patent is invalid or not 
infringed.63  The innovator drug companies began exploiting the 
30-month stay provision by layering patent listings in the Orange 
Book following the filing of an ANDA with a paragraph IV 
 57 See FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at ch. 1, pp. 3–4.  Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act prohibits monopolies and attempts to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 58 “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
hereby declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 59 FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at ch. 1, pp. 3–4.  See also infra notes 76–
86 and accompanying text (discussing In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 
903 (6th Cir. 2003)); infra notes 121–144 and accompanying text (discussing In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
 60 FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 50 (Box 4-4), 55. 
 61 Id. at 39. 
 62 Id.  See also discussion supra, Part II. 
 63 Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 558, 563 n.4 (D.N.J. 
2004). 
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certification, which invoked successive 30-month stays.64  In a 
number of cases, the stays extended well beyond 30 months.65  
Thus, the use of multiple 30-month stays potentially creates an 
unlawful monopoly that can be interpreted as extending patent 
rights beyond their statutory grants.66
The 180-day exclusivity provision was created to incentivize 
generic drug companies to challenge innovator drug patents with 
paragraph IV certification filings.67  These exclusivity periods are 
enormously profitable for the generic drug companies.68  From an 
antitrust perspective, the exclusivity periods raise antitrust issues 
as horizontal restraints of trade, because NDA holders and ANDA 
applicants may be motivated to create anticompetitive deals and 
settlements involving the exclusivity period.  The anticompetitive 
conduct was from both the generic and innovator companies.  On 
the generic side, in some cases, generic companies “parked” their 
exclusivity by failing to market the generic drug in a timely 
manner.69  Under the original Hatch-Waxman statute, the 
exclusivity did not begin until the generic company began to 
market the drug, and other ANDA applications were not 
approvable until the exclusivity period was over.70  Thus, if a first 
filed ANDA with exclusivity failed to market the generic drug in a 
 64 This is the subject of Chapter 4 of the FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY.  Supra note 28, at 
39. 
 65 Id.  See Table 4-3, p. 49 for a number of specific examples. 
 66 In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  A related 
issue is whether there is an exemption from the antitrust laws provided to Orange Book 
listings under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and whether Orange Book listings are a 
petition to the government and thus immune from antitrust laws.  United Mine Workers 
of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); see also In re Buspirone, supra at 368–69.  The 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine exempts from antitrust liability efforts to persuade the 
government to take an action that would otherwise create a restraint or monopoly. In re  
Buspirone, supra at 368–69.  The Southern District of New York has ruled that Noerr-
Pennington does not apply to patent listings in the Orange Book.  See FTC, GENERIC 
DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 46 (Box 4-3). 
 67 Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. (3M) v. Barr Labs., Inc., 289 F.3d 775, 778 (Fed. Cir. 
2002).  See also Section II supra. 
 68 Barr Laboratories, a leading generic drug company, reportedly earned $311 million 
during the six month exclusivity period it had for fluoxetine. Rouhi, supra note 2, at 53–
59. 
 69 FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 7. 
 70 Id. 
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timely manner due to a settlement with the innovator company, 
generic copies would stay off the market entirely.71  On the 
innovator side, NDA holders have been tempted to enter into 
agreements with generic companies to pay the generics to defer 
marketing in order to keep generic competitors off the market.72
Another feature of Hatch-Waxman are the declaratory 
judgment provisions, in which Congress attempted to create a 
cause of action for generic market entrants to clarify the patent 
landscape prior to marketing.  As will be seen, these actions have 
become an important weapon for attacking the 180-day exclusivity 
period.73
IV. AGREEMENTS TO DELAY THE MARKETING OF GENERIC DRUGS 
A. Agreements Outside the Scope of a Patent Grant As An Illegal 
Restraint of Trade 
As a consequence of the threat to innovator drugs by generic 
companies seeking the 180-day exclusivity period, the innovator 
companies, in several instances, approached generic companies 
with attempts to make deals to defer the introduction of the generic 
drug.  Two significant recent cases in this area are In re Cardizem 
CD Antitrust Litigation74 and In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litigation.75
In the Cardizem CD case, an agreement held to be outside the 
statutory grant of a patent was condemned as a per se antitrust 
violation.  Andrx Pharmaceuticals filed an ANDA to sell a generic 
copy of Cardizem CD, a once per day extended release form of 
diltiazem hydrochloride, a drug indicated for cardiovascular 
 71 Id. 
 72 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 73 See infra notes 248–277 and accompanying text (discussing sertraline in Teva 
Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (Teva v. Pfizer II), 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and 
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. FDA (Teva v. FDA III), 398 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2005)). 
 74 In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 896. 
 75 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
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disease.76  Cardizem CD was manufactured by Hoechst Marion 
Roussel (“HMR,” now part of Sanofi-Aventis Pharmaceuticals).  
In September 1995, Andrx filed the first ANDA for Cardizem CD 
with a paragraph IV certification, entitling it to the 180-day 
exclusivity period once Andrx began marketing its copy of the 
drug.77  The patent at issue, U.S. 5,470,584, (the ’584 patent) 
claimed the dissolution profile of the extended release 
formulation.78  HMR sued Andrx in January 1996 for patent 
infringement, triggering the 30-month stay of approval, which 
would expire in July 1998.79 Andrx counterclaimed with antitrust 
and unfair competition allegations against HMR.80
On September 15, 1997, the FDA tentatively approved Andrx’s 
ANDA, indicating that the drug could be marketed on the earlier 
date of a court decision favorable to Andrx on the infringement 
suit, or the expiry of the 30-month stay.81  However, on September 
24, 1997, HMR and Andrx entered into an agreement, whereby 
Andrx agreed not to market its generic version of Cardizem CD 
until the earliest of: (1) a favorable and unappealable court 
decision that Andrx did not infringe the patent; (2) HMR and 
Andrx entered into a license agreement; or (3) HMR entered into a 
license agreement with a third party.  Andrx further agreed to drop 
its antitrust and unfair competition claims against HMR, and it 
would retain its 180-day exclusivity.  In return, HMR agreed to 
pay Andrx $10 million per quarter after Andrx received final 
approval, and $100 million, per year, less the quarterly payments, 
until the patent suit was resolved.82
HMR began making payments to Andrx in July 1998, on the 
expiry of the statutory 30-month stay.83  Andrx’s product was 
reformulated and received final approval for marketing in June 
1999.  By this time, HMR had paid Andrx $89 million,84 and the 
 76 In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 901–02. 
 77 Id. at 902. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 902. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 903. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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agreement delayed the introduction of a generic copy of Cardizem 
CD for 11 months. 
A number of antitrust lawsuits were filed in this matter, as 
early as August, 1998, all of which were consolidated into the 
federal district court for the Eastern District of Michigan.85  The 
central holding was that the agreement to delay the introduction of 
Andrx’s generic version of Cardizem CD was a “classic example 
of a per se illegal restraint of trade,” because Andrx had designed 
around the ’584 patent.86  Thus, the agreement fell outside the 
scope of the patent grant.87
A similar situation occurred in Valley Drug Company v. 
Geneva Pharmaceutical, Inc. (“Terazosin II”),88 where the court 
held that an agreement based on invalid patents was likewise 
illegal because the agreement was not based on valid patent claims.  
In Terzosin II,89 patent validity was central to the antitrust 
analysis. 
Terazosin, a drug for high blood pressure and benign prostatic 
hyperplasia, was first marketed by Abbott under the brand name 
Hytrin in 1987.90  In 1993, Geneva Pharmaceuticals filed several 
ANDA’s to manufacture a generic version of Terazosin.  Then, in 
1996, Abbott Laboratories obtained an additional patent, U.S. 
5,504,207 (the “’207 patent”), claiming polymorphic forms of the 
drug substance,91 and Geneva filed a paragraph IV certification 
against that patent.92  Abbott sued Geneva for patent 
infringement,93 and Geneva won a motion for summary judgment 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 908.  For a general discussion of per se restraints of trade, noting that a per se 
restraint is a horizontal restraint so “inherently anticompetitive” that inquiry into the harm 
caused is unnecessary, see id. at 907 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)). 
 87 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–08 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 88 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Terazosin II), 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 1298. 
 91 In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin III), 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 
1289 (S.D. Fla. 2005). 
 92 Id. at 1289. 
 93 Id. 
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on a claim that the ’207 patent was invalid because of an “on-sale 
bar” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).94
Abbott and Geneva then entered into an agreement to defer 
marketing of Geneva’s Terazosin until either another generic 
entered the market or there was an appellate judgment.95  Abbott 
agreed to pay into an escrow account $4.5 million per month 
beginning in April, 1998, until the question was settled.96  The 
agreement lasted until August of 1999, and most of the funds in the 
escrow account were returned to Abbott.97  The Agreements were 
apparently terminated in response to an FTC investigation.98  
Geneva thereupon launched its generic Terazosin in August 
1999.99
Antitrust plaintiffs, which included drug wholesalers, drug 
store chains, health insurers, and individuals, brought suit alleging 
antitrust violations.  Judge Seitz of the Southern District of Florida 
granted plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment,100 
concluding that the Agreements were per se violations of section 1 
of the Sherman Act because they were geographic market 
allocation agreements between horizontal competitors, essentially 
allocating the entire market to Abbott, who shared its profits with 
other cartel members during the life of the agreement.101  Judge 
Seitz’s opinion concluded that the “defendants’ horizontal market 
allocation agreements would tend to inhibit domestic output and 
price competition without creating efficiencies for American 
consumers, and the defendants have not adduced sufficient facts to 
place the illegality of their restraints in genuine dispute.”102
 94 Id at 1289–90. 
 95 Id. at 1290–91. 
 96 Id. at 1291. 
 97 As of the termination date, there was $49.5 million in the escrow account, and under 
the terms of the termination agreement, $45 million was returned to Abbott. Id. 
 98 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Terazosin II), 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 
2003) . 
 99 In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin III), 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 
1291 (S.D. Fla. 2005). 
 100 In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin I), 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340 
(S.D. Fla. 2000). 
 101 Terazosin II, 344 F.3d at 1301. 
 102 Terazosin I, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1354. 
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The court identified several elements of the agreement as 
anticompetitive, including Geneva’s agreement not to market 
tablets and capsules of Terazosin until the agreement terminated, 
and Geneva’s promise to aid Abbott in opposing the entry of other 
generic Terazosin products.103  Defendants Geneva and Abbott 
appealed to the 11th Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in 
concluding that the Agreements were per se violations of the 
Sherman Act and that issues of material fact were still in 
dispute.104  The defendants argued that there were pro-competitive 
justifications that warrant analysis under the rule of reason, and 
that patent litigation settlements must be analyzed under the rule-
of-reason unless it is shown that the settlements were a sham.105
The 11th Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court.  
They concluded: 
[E]xposing settling parties to antitrust liability for the 
exclusionary effects of a settlement reasonably within the 
scope of the patent merely because the patent is 
subsequently declared invalid would undermine the patent 
incentives. Patent litigation is too complex and the results 
too uncertain for parties to accurately forecast whether 
enforcing the exclusionary right through settlement will 
expose them to treble damages if the patent immunity were 
destroyed by the mere invalidity of the patent.106
Thus, the 11th Circuit concluded that a settlement within the 
scope of a valid patent could not be subject to per se antitrust 
condemnation.107  Restricting settlement options would increase 
the cost of patent enforcement and impair incentives for disclosure 
and innovation.108  Furthermore, this is in accordance with Walker 
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machine & Chemical 
Corporation, which stated that permitting antitrust liability on a 
 103 Terazosin II, 344 F.3d at 1301–02. 
 104 Id. at 1303. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 1308. 
 107 Id. at 1309, 1314. 
 108 Id. at 1308. 
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mere showing of invalidity can “chill the disclosure of inventions” 
by obtaining patents because of fear of punitive consequences.109
One of the most significant factors in Terazosin II is that the 
Court distinguished anticompetitive conduct within and without of 
the patent regime.110  Both per se and rule of reason analysis were 
noted to assess the anticompetitive effects of particular conduct, 
but this court concluded that in patent cases a different standard of 
analysis was needed, that assesses the extent to which 
anticompetitive conduct undermines innovation and disclosure, or 
the extent to which the patent laws shield patentees and potential 
infringers with whom they settle from antitrust liability.111  Thus, 
this court held that there was a patent exception for antitrust 
liability, but that exception was limited by the terms of the patent 
and the statutory rights granted to the patentee.112  In other words, 
the 11th Circuit seemed to be advocating for a special standard of 
review where the alleged restraints involve patented products. 
The court stated that the appropriate issues on remand would 
likely involve an identification of the protection afforded by the 
patents, the relevant FDA law, and whether or not the agreements 
reflected a reasonable implementation of these factors.113
However, on remand, Judge Seitz of the Southern District of 
Florida again held, under the Terazosin II instructions, that the 
Agreements violated § 1 of the Sherman Act because the scope of 
the Agreements exceeded the scope of the protections afforded to 
Abbott under the ’207 patent.114  The district court repeated the 
holding that the agreements were per se violations of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act because the horizontal market allocation was so 
obviously anticompetitive and was an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.115  The district court appeared to disregard the instruction of 
 109 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 180 
(1965). 
 110 Terazosin II, 344 F.3d at 1311 (citing to “accommodation of differing policies” of 
patent and non-patent exclusionary conduct in Walker Process, 382 U.S. 172). 
 111 Id. at 1311. 
 112 Id. at 1312. 
 113 Id. 
 114 In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin III), 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 
1319 (S.D. Fla. 2005). 
 115 Id. 
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a new standard of review, as suggested in Terazosin II, in making 
this decision.  A major factor in this holding was the questionable 
validity of the ’207 patent, which “was likely to be invalidated by 
the district court.”116  This opinion, that the ’207 was likely 
invalid, was in turn a major factor in the holding that the 
agreements exceeded the scope of the patent, and that the 
agreements did not represent a reasonable interpretation of the 
patent protections.117
To date, this case tells us that basing a reverse payment 
agreement on a patent of questionable validity will likely incur a 
holding of an antitrust violation.  Thus, this case to a large extent 
fulfills the hypothetical posed at the end of the Ciprofloxacin 
case,118 that reliance on a patent where the validity is questionable, 
and there was a strong case for invalidity, is a risky strategy.  This 
puts generic companies in a bind, because they should balance the 
desire to zealously invalidate innovator patents with the possibility 
that they can make a deal with the innovator.  If the case for 
invalidity case is too strong, the deal will be subject to antitrust 
liability.  By contrast, if the generic company thought that a deal 
with an innovator was possible, they might not pursue an 
aggressive invalidity strategy, and would pursue some other 
colorable, but possibly less than zealous, strategy for getting an 
ANDA approval with a paragraph IV certification. 
B. Agreements Within the Scope of the Patent Grant Do Not Incur 
Antitrust Liability 
In contrast to the Cardizem CD119 and Terazosin II120 cases, 
where agreements among innovator and generic drug companies 
outside the scope of patent claims incurred antitrust liability, other 
cases where the agreements were held to be within the scope of 
patent claims were upheld with no valid antitrust claims.  In the 
case of Ciprofloxacin, an agreement between the innovator and a 
 116 Id. at 1317. 
 117 Id. at 1307–68. 
 118 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005).  See also infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 119 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 120 Terazosin II, 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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generic drug company was held to be within the claim scope, and 
the antitrust plaintiffs were unsuccessful.121  Ciprofloxacin is a 
quinolone antibacterial, used for the treatment of infections, and 
was first marketed in 1987 by Miles Laboratories, the U.S. 
predecessor to Bayer Pharmaceuticals.  The main patent covering 
the product was U.S. 4,670,444 (the “’444 patent”),122 expiry 
December 9, 2003.123  Barr Laboratories filed an ANDA in 
October 1991, with a paragraph IV certification to the ’444 patent, 
contending that it was invalid and unenforceable, and notified 
Bayer in December 1991 as required by the Hatch-Waxman 
amendments.124  Bayer sued Barr in the Southern District of New 
York for patent infringement.125  The 30-month stay would have 
expired in July 1994, but the parties agreed to extend the stay until 
the case was settled.126
On January 8, 1997, Bayer and Barr settled just before trial,127 
with an agreement whereby Barr acknowledged the validity of the 
’444 patent,128 and in return Bayer made an immediate payment to 
Barr of $49.1 million, and quarterly payments of about $15 million 
until the ’444 patent expired.129  Bayer ultimately paid Barr $398 
million under this agreement.130
Antitrust plaintiffs, including unions, drug wholesalers, and 
individuals, sued alleging antitrust violations, arguing that the 1997 
agreements violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.131  The plaintiffs 
 121 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro III), 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 122 Id. at 518. 
 123 Id. at 519. 
 124 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro I), 166 F. Supp. 2d 740, 
744 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 125 Id.  The case has no citation for the original Hatch-Waxman action for patent 
infringement, filed in the Southern District of New York, Jan. 16, 1992, probably because 
the parties settled without a decision. Id.  The Eastern District decision cited here was the 
antitrust action. 
 126 Id. 
 127 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro III), 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 
519 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 128 Cipro I, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 745. 
 129 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro II), 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 
196 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Cipro III, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 517. 
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alleged that “but for” the Agreements, generic ciprofloxacin would 
have appeared in 1997, many years earlier than it was actually 
marketed generically.132  Barr received tentative approval to 
market ciprofloxacin in January 1995, and reportedly received full 
approval in January 1997.133  The payments here, termed 
“reverse,” “exit” or “exclusion payments,”134 have an 
anticompetitive appearance because they appear to offer nothing 
by the recipient of the payments in return, other than staying off 
the market, which preserves a monopoly that would otherwise be 
extinguished.  The defense was that the 1997 agreements did not 
extend the beyond the scope of the ’444 patent.135
In the Cipro II decision, Judge David Trager of the Eastern 
District of New York held that there was no per se violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act by the Bayer-Barr agreements 
because the exclusionary effect of the agreements were within the 
scope of the ’444 patent.136  However, the decision left open the 
possibility that a rule-of-reason analysis could find a Sherman Act 
violation.137  In the Cipro III decision,  Judge Trager held that in 
the ciprofloxacin market, Bayer had market power, but the ’444 
patent gave Bayer the right to exclude others during the term of the 
patent,138 and that a validity inquiry was not necessary because 
conduct within the scope of a patent is exempt from antitrust 
scrutiny.139  Judge Trager noted that there was “no legal basis for 
restricting the rights of patentees to choose their enforcement 
vehicle” such as a settlement agreement or litigation of a  
 132 According to the FDA’s website, generic ciprofloxacin was not finally approved for 
marketing until June 9, 2004.  Ciprofloxacin: Label and Approval History, DRUGS @ 
FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
Search.Label_ApprovalHistory#apphist (last visited July 29, 2006). 
 133 Cipro I, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 744. 
 134 Cipro III, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 520. 
 135 Id. at 517. 
 136 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro II), 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 
196, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 137 The rule-of-reason analysis was litigated in Cipro III. 363 F. Supp. 2d 514.  A rule-
of-reason analysis balances the alleged adverse effects of the conduct with its 
procompetitive benefits. See id. at 520 (discussing the application of a rule-of-reason 
analysis). 
 138 Id. at 523–24. 
 139 Id. at 530. 
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challenged patent.140  The parties may sensibly conclude that either 
course of action was more appropriate.141  Since the plaintiffs did 
not challenge the validity of the ’444 patent,142 it was presumed to 
be valid, the settlement was held to be proper and within the patent 
scope.143  Because the plaintiffs did not show that the agreements 
had anti-competitive effects beyond the scope of the ’444 patent, 
the rule of reason analysis failed.144  Thus, the mere payment of 
money to keep an otherwise patented product off the market does 
not prove an anticompetitive or adverse effect on the market. 
Significantly, Judge Trager’s reasoning was predicated on a 
presumption of patent validity.  Indeed, it is not clear if the original 
patent challenge at the Southern District of New York would have 
succeeded in invaliding the patent.  One can infer that Judge 
Trager would have felt differently in a situation in which the patent 
facially appeared to be invalid.  In the Ciprofloxacin litigation, the 
antitrust plaintiffs did not argue the validity of the patent, only the 
antitrust implications of the Agreements.  In a case where the 
patent validity was in question presumably the outcome would be 
the opposite, since the monopoly of a patent ends if it is declared 
invalid, so any agreement to extend a facially invalid patent could 
be held to exceed the scope of the patent.  The issue gets sticky, 
however, because patent validity, and indeed any judicial 
proceeding, engenders unpredictable outcomes. 
A similar situation, where the validity of exclusionary 
agreements within the scope of valid patent claims was upheld, 
involved tamoxifen, a drug for breast cancer.145  In 1987, Barr 
Laboratories filed the first ANDA for tamoxifen containing a 
 140 Id. at 531–32. 
 141 Id. at 532 (citing T & T Mfg. Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 449 F. Supp. 813, 827 (D.R.I. 
1978), aff’d 587 F.2d 533 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 S. Ct. (2000)). 
 142 Id. at 531. 
 143 Id. at 540. 
 144 Id. at 541.  In addition, Judge Trager held that consumers, who were antitrust 
plaintiffs in this case, had no standing to sue because “consumers . . . who may feel that 
they are being charged supracompetitive prices by the patentee have no cause of action to 
invalidate the patent.” Id. 
 145 See generally In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig. (Tamoxifen III), 429 F.3d 370 
(2d Cir. 2005). 
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paragraph IV certification.146  ICI147 sued Barr for patent 
infringement, and in April 1992, the district court ruled that the ICI 
patent in the suit was invalid because ICI deliberately withheld 
critical information from the patent examiner (“Tamoxifen I”).148
ICI appealed to the Federal Circuit, and in 1993, while the 
appeal was pending, the parties entered into a confidential 
agreement, whereby Zeneca, which had succeeded the patent 
ownership from ICI, agreed to pay Barr $21 million, and in return 
Barr changed its patent certification to Paragraph III, meaning that 
Barr would wait until the expiry of the patent at issue in 2002 
before marketing its copy of Tamoxifen.149  During the term of the 
agreement, prior to the expiry of the patent in 2002, Barr agreed to 
market, under its label, Tamoxifen manufactured by Zeneca.150  
The parties also agreed that if the patent was held to be invalid or 
unenforceable in a litigation from another generic drug firm, that 
Barr would be able to change its patent certification back to 
paragraph IV to put itself back into the position it had been in 
during the initial litigation.151
The Zeneca-Barr agreement was contingent on the vacatur of 
the district court judgment in Tamoxifen I, and the Federal Circuit 
granted a joint motion to dismiss Tamoxifen I.152  Subsequently, 
three additional generic companies filed ANDA’s for Tamoxifen 
with paragraph IV certifications.153  In each of the subsequent 
ANDA’s, Zeneca responded with a patent infringement suit, and in 
each case, the court rejected the attempts of the generic company 
to rely on the vacated Tamoxifen I decision, and in contrast to 
Tamoxifen I, upheld the validity of the Zeneca patent.154
In 1998, Barr restored its paragraph IV certification, and 
invoked its entitlement to the 180-day exclusivity as the first 
 146 Id. at 377. 
 147 ICI is the predecessor in interest to Zeneca. Id.  Zeneca is now AstraZeneca. 
 148 Id. (citing Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Barr Labs., Inc, 795 F. Supp. 619, 626–27 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 378. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 379. 
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generic company to file a paragraph IV certification.155  Because 
this action precluded final approval of other ANDA’s until the 
exclusivity period was over, this action prevented the FDA from 
approving other Tamoxifen copies.156  Barr did not exercise its 
exclusivity and continued to market Zeneca’s Tamoxifen under the 
1993 agreement.157  These actions were successful in preventing 
the introduction of generic Tamoxifen until the expiration of the 
patent in August 2002.158
Some thirty antitrust lawsuits were filed by consumers and 
consumer groups challenging the validity of the 1993 agreement 
between Zeneca and Barr.159  The key contention of the antitrust 
plaintiffs was that the agreement allowed Zeneca and Barr to 
circumvent the district court invalidation of the Zeneca patent in 
Tamoxifen I, which the plaintiffs asserted would have been 
affirmed at the Federal Circuit.160  The affirmance would have 
triggered the 180 day exclusivity period, and other generic 
companies would have marketed lower cost Tamoxifen copies 
several years earlier than they actually entered the market.161
The defendants were granted a motion to dismiss the class 
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted, under Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6).162  The district court reasoned 
that a patent holder may settle with a potential infringer without 
offending the Sherman Act, provided that the agreement does act 
beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.163
The antitrust plaintiffs appealed, but the Second Circuit upheld 
the district court.164  The major findings were that the settlement 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 380. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id.  The suits were consolidated as a class action in the Eastern District of New York.  
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig. (Tamoxifen II), 277 F. Supp. 2d 121 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
 160 Tamoxifen III, 429 F.3d at 380–81. 
 161 Id. at 379–80. 
 162 Id. at 381 (citing Tamoxifen II, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 140). 
 163 Id. at 381. 
 164 Id. at 405.  The decision was a 2-1 plurality written by Judge Sack.  Judge Pooler 
dissented, and would have reversed the motion to dismiss and remanded for trial. Id. 
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and vacatur of the Tamoxifen I litigation was not an antitrust 
violation,165 that the reverse payments were proper in scope and 
size, in that under Hatch-Waxman, generic challengers gain 
considerable leverage, which redistributes risk assessments,166 that 
the settlement agreement did not extend the patent monopoly,167 
and that Barr’s claim to the 180 day exclusivity period was not an 
antitrust violation.168  The key finding, for the purpose of this 
paper, of both the district court and appeal court, is that an 
agreement that does not exceed the scope of the patent grant will 
not create an antitrust violation. 
Another significant reverse payments case with significant 
lessons for the industry involved extended release potassium 
chloride (“Schering”).169  As with Terazosin and Tamoxifen, the 
agreement here was held to be within the scope of valid patent 
claim, and therefore did not incur antitrust liability.  In Schering, a 
delayed entry based on legitimate patent rights was held to be 
proper and procompetitive. 
Schering marketed an extended release form of potassium 
chloride under the brand name “K-Dur 20,” which used a 
formulation patented in U.S. 4,863,743 (the “’743 patent”), expiry 
September 5, 2006.170  In 1995, Upsher-Smith Laboratories filed 
an ANDA for a generic version of K-Dur 20, called “Klor Con,” 
with a paragraph IV certification against the ’743 patent.171  
Schering sued for patent infringement, but prior to trial in June 
1997, the parties entered into a settlement, whereby Schering and 
Upsher agreed that Schering would license several Upsher drugs 
for an upfront payment, and in return, Upsher would not launch 
Klor Con until September 1, 2001.172  In particular, Schering was 
interested in the Upsher drug “Niacor,” an extended release niacin 
 165 Id. at 389. 
 166 Id. at 391. 
 167 Id. at 400. 
 168 Id. at 401. 
 169 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc 
denied, 147 Fed. Appx. 156 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 170 Id. at 1067. 
 171 Id. at 1058–59. 
 172 Id.  The basis for the entry date of Klor Con is not explained in the decision. 
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product used to reduce cholesterol.173  When the agreement was 
finalized, Schering made a $60 million upfront payment to Upsher, 
plus a $10 million milestone payment and an agreement for royalty 
payments of 10% or 15% of sales for Niacor.174
Another generic drug company, ESI Lederle, (“ESI”) also filed 
an ANDA for an extended release potassium chloride product.175  
Schering sued ESI, but the parties settled in December 1997, with 
ESI agreeing to delay the introduction of its product until January 
1, 2004 in return for a fee of $5 million, attributed to legal fees, 
plus an additional $10 million only if ESI’s product was approved 
by a certain date.176  In addition, Schering agreed to license two 
generic drugs, enalapril and buspirone, in exchange for a payment 
of $15 million.177
On March 30, 2001, the FTC filed an administrative complaint 
against Schering, Upsher, and ESI’s parent, American Home 
Products, alleging that the agreements were illegal restraints of 
trade and that Schering monopolized and conspired to monopolize 
the potassium supplement market.178
The FTC complaint was tried before an Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”), who dismissed the complaint, holding that the 
agreements were lawful settlements of the patent lawsuits.179  The 
ALJ held that a finding that the settlements were anticompetitive 
required an assumption that either the ’743 patent was invalid or 
that the generic drugs would not have infringed the ’743 patent, 
and there was no basis for either assumption.180  In addition, the 
ALJ held that the payments to Upsher and ESI were not 
anticompetitive per se, but legitimate payments based on patent 
rights.181  Finally, the ALJ dismissed as unproven the complaint 
 173 Id. at 1059 n.3. 
 174 Id. at 1060. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 1060–61. 
 177 Id. at 1060–61 n.6. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 1060–61. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
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that Schering maintained in illegal monopoly in the potassium 
chloride supplement market.182
The FTC’s counsel appealed this decision to the full 
Commission, which reversed the ALJ, holding that the agreements 
with Upsher and ESI violated the FTC Act and the Sherman 
Act.183  The Commission did not rule on the per se legality of the 
payments, but concluded that the quid pro quo for the payment was 
a delay of generic market entry, which illegally harmed 
consumers.184  In contrast to the ALJ’s consideration of the patent 
rights at issue, the Commission used a “might have been” analysis 
of entry dates absent the challenged payments as determinative.185  
The Commission held that the payments to Upsher and ESI were 
not legitimate consideration for delaying market entry, so the 
Commission prohibited settlements whereby a generic drug 
company receives “anything of value” for delaying market 
development activities.186  The only carve-out to this policy was a 
limited payment, not to exceed $2 million, for litigation costs.187
Schering and Upsher appealed this decision to the 11th 
Circuit.188  The 11th Circuit applied the “substantial evidence” 
standard it developed in the Terazosin II case189 and stated that 
neither a rule-of-reason nor per se analysis was appropriate for 
antitrust analysis in patent cases because patents by nature are 
exclusionary and anticompetitive.190  The court repeated the 
opinion it expressed in Terazosin II,191 that in patent cases, 
antitrust liability requires an examination of (1) the exclusionary 
scope of the patent; (2) the extent to which agreements exceed the 
scope; and (3) the resulting anti-competitive effect.192  Thus, the 
 182 Id. at 1062. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 1065–66. 
 191 See infra notes 88–118 and accompanying text (discussing Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Terazosin II), 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
 192 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc 
denied, 147 Fed. Appx. 156 (11th Cir. 2005)(citing Terazosin II, 344 F.3d at 1312 n.15 ). 
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court held that because of the ’743 patent, Schering had the right to 
exclude Upsher and ESI until either they proved the patent invalid 
or that their generic copies did not infringe the patent.193  There 
was no basis for challenging the validity of the ’743 patent, so it 
was considered valid.194  Further, it appeared that both generic 
copies were infringing the ’743 patent.195  The FTC case turned on 
the substantiality of evidence supporting the FTC assertion that the 
challenged agreements restrict competition beyond the statutory 
exclusion of the ’743 patent.196  The 11th Circuit held that the 
evidence relied on by the ALJ was reliable,197 that the challenged 
agreement expressly described the payments to Upsher as 
royalties,198 and that the agreements did not exceed the scope of 
the ’743 patent.199  The court noted that the scope of the Schering-
Upsher agreement demonstrated an efficient narrowness, and in 
not exceeding the scope of the ’743 patent, was not 
anticompetitive.200  Thus, the court concluded that the settlements 
were proper and reversed the FTC.201
This case highlights many important points that sharpen the 
balance between the exclusions of patents and the anticompetitive 
benefits of the antitrust regime.  The FTC seemed unconcerned 
with Schering’s patent rights in holding that the agreements were 
anticompetitive.202  By contrast, the 11th Circuit noted that 
patentees “should not be in a worse position, by virtue of their 
patent rights, to negotiate and settle surrounding lawsuits.”203  
Further, “[b]y entering into the settlement agreements, Schering 
realized the full potential of its infringement suit—a determination 
that the ’743 patent was valid and that ESI and Upsher would not 
 193 Id. at 1068. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 1071. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 1072. 
 200 Id. at 1073. 
 201 Id. at 1076. 
 202 Id. at 1072 (noting that the FTC “refused to consider the underlying patent 
litigation.”). 
 203 Id. 
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infringe.”204  Upsher and ESI obtained less than they would have 
had they won the suit, but there was no assurance of victory in 
court.205  As reiterated from Terazosin II, “[d]ue to the 
‘asymmetrics of risk and large profits at stake, even a patentee 
confident in the validity of its patent might pay a potential 
infringer a substantial sum in settlement.’”206 In other words, the 
outcome of litigation is never assured.  Further, the “caustic 
environment” of patent litigation can decrease innovation by 
“amplifying the period of uncertainty” around a drug 
manufacturers’ ability to bring a new or generic drug to market.207  
Thus, the court held that patent settlements, such as the type in the 
Schering case, actually facilitate innovation and competition.208
This case has important lessons for drug companies.  The 
guidance of Schering is that where a generic company files a 
paragraph IV certification, and there is a settlement involving 
payments to the generic company, then they can likely evade 
antitrust liability if they avoid the appearance of a simple payment 
to stay off the market.  Innovator companies may want to make 
such payments to avoid the litigation risk of invalidating their 
patent, and generic companies want to receive them to avoid the 
litigation risk that they will lose and have to wait for other limiting 
patents or exclusivity to expire.  Ways the appearance of a simple 
payoff can be avoided are expressions of a legitimate business 
purpose in the settlement agreement, evidence of diligence in 
establishing the business purpose, and a limitation on the scope of 
any agreement to the scope of the patent.  The presence of a quid 
pro quo of the generic company offering something else to the 
innovator, such as a license to a developed product, will also be 
helpful in avoiding the appearance of a reverse payment. 
 204 Id. at 1075. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 1075. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
BERKSFINALEDIT_091706_CLEAN 9/17/2006  5:41:05 PM 
1334 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1305 
 
V. ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF THE 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY AND 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
The Hatch-Waxman amendments, both pre- and post-MMA, 
provided for a trigger to the 180-day exclusivity on a judicial 
holding of invalidity or noninfringement.209  A recent example 
relating to this issue involved sertraline,210 where a subsequent 
ANDA filer attempted to extinguish a 180-day exclusivity through 
a declaratory judgment action.  Here, Teva Pharmaceuticals filed a 
declaratory judgment action in an attempt to make a showing of a 
judicial decision within the meaning of the FDCA, which triggers 
the 180-day exclusivity period.211  If the judicial declaration had 
been granted, the 180-day period would be triggered on the date of 
the decision rather than on an expiry of a limiting patent, and the 
exclusivity period would run and expire prior to the ability of the 
FDA to approve the first ANDA.212  The effect of this procedure is 
to deprive the first ANDA applicant of its exclusivity.  There are 
arguments that this procedure could be a restraint of trade, by 
improperly depriving a party of an exclusionary right under the 
patent and food and drug laws.  A contrary argument is the 
consumerist view in favor of bringing low cost competitors to 
market as quickly as possible, and that delays in the 
commencement of the 180-day exclusivity period are a restraint of 
trade that harms consumers.213
This litigation involved sertraline, a major “SSRI” drug 
prescribed for depression and marketed under the brand name 
 209 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) (pre-MMA).  Teva Pharms. USA v. FDA (Teva v. 
FDA I), 182 F.3d 1003, 1007–08 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  Under the MMA, there is a similar 
provision in the forfeiture provisions at  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA)–(BB).  
Under this provision, if a first filer otherwise entitled to 180-day exclusivity does not 
market the product within 75 days of an infringement action, a declaratory judgment 
action, or settlement agreement holding the patent to be invalid or not infringed (i.e., a 
trigger), the exclusivity is forfeited. 
 210 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (Teva v. Pfizer II), 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 211 Id. at 1328. 
 212 Id. 
 213 The FTC and AARP filed amicus curiae briefs in support of Teva (to quash the 
exclusivity period), suggesting that the patent listings and settlements caused Teva 
economic injury. Id. at 1335. 
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“Zoloft.”  The background is that Ivax Pharmaceuticals214 had 
filed the first ANDA to manufacture generic sertraline in 1999 
with a Paragraph III certification to U.S. patent 4,356,518 (the 
“’518 patent”),215 expiry June 30, 2006, which claims the sertraline 
chemical compound.216  The paragraph III certification meant that 
Ivax did not intend to challenge the ’518 patent as not infringed or 
invalid.  Ivax therefore agreed to wait until the expiry of the ’518 
patent before launching its product.217  In the same ANDA, Ivax 
filed a paragraph IV certification to the other patent at issue in this 
case, U.S. 5,248,699 (the “’699 patent”), expiry September 28, 
2010,218 which claimed a novel crystalline form of sertraline and a 
method for preparing it.219  Pfizer timely sued Ivax for 
infringement, but the parties settled in 2002, with Pfizer giving 
Ivax a royalty-bearing license on the ’699 patent.220  With this 
license, Ivax should be free to launch a generic sertraline on the 
expiration of the ’518 patent.221  Ivax was the first generic 
pharmaceutical company to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV 
certification to the ’699 patent, so it should be entitled to the 180-
day exclusivity period.222
Meanwhile, Teva Pharmaceuticals filed an ANDA to 
manufacture generic sertraline in July, 2002, with the same 
paragraph III and IV certifications that Ivax made.223  Teva 
notified Pfizer as required by the Hatch-Waxman amendments, but 
Pfizer did not sue Teva within the 45-day period as required by the 
Hatch-Waxman amendments.224  Thereafter, Teva filed a 
declaratory judgement action against Pfizer in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts, under 28 U.S.C. 
 214 At the time of the ANDA filing, Ivax Pharmaceuticals was then known as Zenith 
Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Id. at 1330. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. at 1329. 
 217 Id. at 1330. 
 218 Id. at 1329. 
 219 Id.  Ivax’s specific non-infringement or invalidity allegations are not in the opinion 
discussed here. 
 220 Id. at 1330. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 1326–27. 
 224 Id. at 1327. 
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§ 2201(a),225 seeking a declaration that the Teva’s ANDA did not 
infringe the ’699 patent, or alternatively that the ’699 patent was 
invalid.226  On December 8, 2003,227 the district court dismissed 
the case for lack of jurisdiction and failure to establish that an 
actual controversy existed between Teva and Pfizer.228  The court 
held that Teva failed to show Pfizer had taken actions giving rise to 
a “reasonable apprehension” that Pfizer would sue Teva for 
infringement of the ’699 patent.229
Teva appealed the district court decision to the Federal Circuit, 
arguing that the district court erred in holding that there was no 
actual controversy between it and Pfizer as a matter of law.230  The 
majority on the panel affirmed the district court decision.231
The district court applied a two-part test formulated by the 
Federal Circuit for analyzing a controversy in a declaratory 
judgment action.232  Under the test, a declaratory judgment 
plaintiff must show both (1) an explicit threat by the patentee that 
creates a “reasonable apprehension” that it will be sued for 
infringement, and (2) that the plaintiff is engaging in infringing 
activities.233  The district court established that the second prong 
was satisfied by the filing of the ANDA, but that Teva failed to 
satisfy the reasonable apprehension prong.234  It is the latter 
holding that is the truly contentious point in this case.235  Teva 
argued essentially that listing the ’699 in the Orange Book was 
tantamount to an explicit threat and the creation of a reasonable 
 225 Id. at 1331.  Note that the pre-MMA Hatch-Waxman amendments statute, under 
which the Teva declaratory judgment action was first filed, expressly permits an ANDA 
applicant, not sued within 45 days by the NDA holder, to bring a suit under the 
declaratory judgment statute. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000). 
 226 Id. at 1330. 
 227 Note that this decision was issued the same day that the MMA was enacted into law. 
 228 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (Teva v. Pfizer I), 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1791 (D. 
Mass. 2003).  See also Teva v. Pfizer II, 395 F.3d at 1327. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id.  See also id. at 1338.  The majority opinion was written by Judge Schall and 
joined by Judge Clavenger. 
 232 Id. at 1330. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. at 1330–31. 
 235 Id. at 1332. 
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apprehension by an ANDA filer.236  Teva argued that the purpose 
for Orange Book patent listings is to put potential infringers on 
notice that the listed patents are central to the product, and that 
patents are listed in the Orange Book for the purpose of providing 
notice that such patents “could reasonably be asserted” in an 
infringement suit.237  However, these arguments were dismissed by 
the Federal Circuit majority, which held that Teva’s reliance on 
Orange Book patent listings was “misplaced,” and that such 
listings are merely the result of a statutory requirement.238  The 
majority stated: “[w]ithout more, Pfizer’s compliance with the 
Hatch-Waxman listing requirement should not be construed as a 
blanket threat to potential infringers . . . [m]ore is required for an 
actual controversy than the existence of an adversely held 
patent . . .”239  The court stated that under Article III of the 
Constitution, a declaratory judgment plaintiff had to show the 
creation of an actual controversy, not one that is “conjectural or 
hypothetical.”240
Teva also argued that the MMA amendments establish 
jurisdiction without regard to the reasonable apprehension prong of 
the two-part test.241 The MMA amendments were applicable to this 
case because Congress provided that they would apply to any 
pending proceeding on or after the date of enactment, and the 
district court decision was issued the same day as the MMA was 
enacted.242  However, the Federal Circuit majority held that the 
declaratory judgment provisions of the MMA Amendments did not 
alter its analysis, noting that “[w]e do not think that the cases cited 
by Teva support the proposition that the reasonable apprehension 
of suit prong of our traditional two-part test is not a constitutional 
requirement.”243  The majority further went on to cite the 
Conference Committee Report on H.R. 1 (the House version of the 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. at 1333. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. at 1334.  See also supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text (discussing the 
declaratory judgment provisions of the MMA). 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. at 1335. 
BERKSFINALEDIT_091706_CLEAN 9/17/2006  5:41:05 PM 
1338 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1305 
 
Medicare Amendments) as supporting the contention that Congress 
did not intend for the declaratory judgment provisions of the 
Medicare Amendments to alter the courts’ interpretation of the 
constitutional requirements for a declaratory judgment action.244
Although antitrust issues are discussed only indirectly in this 
case, the issues provide valuable insights into the objectives of the 
parties.  The FTC joined Teva with an amicus curiae that the 180-
day exclusivity creates an economic injury, in that 
if Pfizer had not obtained the ’699 patent and listed it in the 
Orange Book, settled its litigation with Ivax, declined to 
sue Teva, and refused Teva’s request for a covenant not to 
sue, Teva would have the opportunity to gain access to the 
Zoloft™ market during the 180-day period that will follow 
the expiration of the ’518 patent.245
The FTC therefore suggests that Pfizer’s conduct was 
monopolistic and an anticompetitive restraint of trade, suggesting 
that Pfizer vigorously defended its agreement to preserve its 
pricing power for an additional six months beyond the expiry of 
the ’518 patent.  However, the potential antitrust violations must be 
balanced with the rights conferred by valid patents, and the intent 
of the Hatch-Waxman amendments to incentivize generic 
companies to obtain 180-day exclusivities as a reward for filing 
successful paragraph IV certifications.  Here, the ’699 was a valid 
patent, and any ANDA applicant seeking to market sertraline on 
the expiry of the ’518 patent had to show either non-infringement 
or invalidity with respect to the ’699 patent.  The burden of 
enforcing patent rights is on the patentee,246 and if Pfizer elected 
not to bring suit against Teva, that fact does not imply that the ’699 
patent is invalid.  Thus, the 180-day exclusivity afforded to a first 
to file paragraph IV certifier is not a patent extension of an earlier 
expiring patent, but rather a bite out of the statutory monopoly of 
the patent to which the paragraph IV certification was made. 
 244 Id. at 1337.  Teva petitioned for a rehearing en banc, but this was denied. Teva 
Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc. (Teva v. Pfizer III), 405 F.3d 990 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 245 Teva v. Pfizer II, 395 F.3d at 1335. 
 246 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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A significant strategic consideration on Pfizer’s part was the 
risk of losing a suit with Teva had Pfizer accepted the invitation 
and sued Teva.  If Pfizer had engaged Teva and lost, the ’699 
patent could be invalidated completely.  If this had happened, then 
Teva and other generic drug companies would have been able to 
enter the market immediately on the expiry of the ’518 patent, and 
no exclusivity would have been awarded because Teva was not the 
first ANDA filer to make a paragraph IV certification against the 
’699 patent.  Thus, this issue of patent certainty boils down to a 
risk-benefit analysis for Pfizer, balancing the risk of losing billions 
in sales that it could share during the exclusivity period with just a 
single competitor, with the chance of a successful outcome in 
litigation.  As the 11th Circuit noted in Terazosin II, there is no 
assurance of the outcome of litigation, and the “asymmetries of 
risk” mitigates towards patentees of extremely valuable patents 
going to great lengths to avoid an infringement trial and the 
possibility that the patent will be declared invalid.247  Therefore, 
from an antitrust perspective, there is a good argument that Pfizer’s 
strategy was a legitimate preservation of its patent rights, rather 
than an improper monopolistic or anticompetitive strategy. 
A related fact pattern for litigation involving the 
hypocholesterolemic drug pravastatin (“Pravastatin”) further 
illustrates the potential of declaratory judgment actions to destroy 
the 180-day exclusivity.248  In this episode, several generic drug 
companies filed ANDA’s to market pravastatin following the 
expiry of U.S. 4,346,227 (the “’227 patent”), on April 20, 2006, 
with paragraph IV certifications to several later expiring patents 
listed in the Orange Book.249  None of the generic drug companies 
were sued by BMS.250  Teva was apparently the first to file and 
was entitled to 180-day exclusivity.251  One of the other ANDA 
applicants, Apotex, sought assurances from BMS that it was not 
infringing the later expiring patents, and despite three letters from 
 247 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Terazosin II), 344 F.3d 1294, 1310 (11th 
Cir. 2003). 
 248 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. FDA, 398 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 249 Id. at 179. 
 250 Id. at 180. 
 251 Id. 
BERKSFINALEDIT_091706_CLEAN 9/17/2006  5:41:05 PM 
1340 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1305 
 
BMS indicating no intention to sue, Apotex filed a declaratory 
judgment action seeking judicial clarification that it was not 
infringing or that the patents were invalid or unenforceable.252  The 
action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under a 
joint motion between the parties.253  The FDA then issued a 
decision maintaining that the 180-day clock started on the date of 
the BMS-Apotex dismissal, on August 22, 2004, and therefore 
expired on February 18, 2005, prior to the expiry of the ’227 
patent.254  Thus, the FDA proposed to deny Teva its exclusivity 
period.  Teva sued the FDA in the D.C. District Court to preserve 
its exclusivity period and enjoin the FDA from approving other 
ANDA’s during the exclusivity period to which it believed it was 
entitled.  The court found that the decision was not a triggering 
court decision under the terms of the Hatch-Waxman statute, and 
granted Teva its injunction.255
The FDA relied on a pair of earlier decisions involving the 
drug ticlodipine256 in support of its position to deny Teva 
exclusivity.  Interestingly, the parties in the ticlopidine litigation 
also involved Teva and Apotex, but in diametrically opposed 
positions.  In the ticlopidine case, Apotex was first to file, and 
Teva was a subsequent filer and sought a declaratory judgement 
that it was not infringing.  Roche, which owned ticlopidine, 
indicated that they would not sue Teva for infringement, and this 
representation was held to be an estoppel for the purposes of the 
statute.  Ultimately in the ticlopidine case, Apotex lost its 
exclusivity as a result of the Teva action.257
The Pravastatin court distinguished several features of the 
Roche representations to not sue Teva over ticlopidine with the 
 252 Id. at 179–80. 
 253 Id. at 180–81. 
 254 The FDA considered the BMS-Apotex dismissal to be a “decision of a court with 
respect to any ANDA, in which the court holds the relevant patent is invalid, 
unenforceable or not infringed” under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) (pre-MMA).  Such 
a court decision is a triggering event for exclusivity. Id. at 181. 
 255 Id. at 192. 
 256 Id.  See also Teva Pharms. USA v. FDA (Teva v. FDA I), 182 F.3d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) and Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. FDA (Teva v. FDA II), 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 
38667, WL 1838303 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion). 
 257 See Teva v. FDA II, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 38667. 
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BMS stipulation to not sue Apotex over pravastatin.  In the 
ticlopidine case, the court had to make a predicate finding of fact, 
which was not necessary in the Pravastatin case.258  Thus, the 
BMS-Apotex dismissal was not a “decision of a court” under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, so the 180 day exclusivity was not triggered 
by the dismissal.259  Therefore, the district court granted Teva’s 
motion for an injunction to preserve its exclusivity for 
pravastatin.260  This decision has been appealed to the D.C. 
Circuit.261
This was an important holding, affirming the preservation of 
180-day exclusivity periods that are critical to the generic drug 
industry.  If a third party could extinguish an exclusivity period on 
the mere filing of a declaratory judgment action, regardless of its 
merit or the representations of the innovator company, then there 
would never be an exclusivity period again.  Although consumer 
groups, and possibly the FTC, appear to be opposed to the 180-day 
exclusivity period, the exclusivity is an important incentive created 
by Congress in the Hatch-Waxman regime, to reward the first 
company to file an ANDA challenging innovator patents.  The 
substantial profits derivable from the exclusivity period262 are an 
important factor in the financial health of the generic drug 
industry.  However, the 180-day exclusivity period is far from 
healthy. 
VI. THE END OF 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY? 
A recurring theme in the cases discussed in this paper is the 
power of the 180-day exclusivity, as an incentive to the generic 
companies, and sometimes as a financial benchmark in the cases 
involving payments to generic companies to defer marketing.  As 
discussed supra, Congress became very concerned over abuses, 
 258 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. FDA (Teva v. FDA III), 398 F. Supp. 2d 176, 191 
(D.D.C. 2005). 
 259 Id. at 190–91. 
 260 Id. at 192. 
 261 Case Docket number 05-5401, filed Nov. 16, 2005. 
 262 See, e.g., Teva v. FDA III, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 180. 
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particularly involving the 180-day exclusivity period.263  Thus, 
Congress created substantial limits on the exclusivity period in the 
MMA with the new forfeiture provisions. 
The forfeiture provisions have significant antitrust 
implications.  While the new provisions are designed to avoid 
situations like that discussed supra in Cardizem CD, 
Ciprofloxacin, and Terazosin, where manipulations of the 180-day 
exclusivity led to allegations of anticompetitive conduct,  the new 
provisions will have other, significant impacts on the generic drug 
industry. 
The new rules seem designed to take away the incentive to file 
an ANDA earlier than 30 months before the expiry of exclusivity, 
and do not account for valid paragraph III certifications later than 
30 months post filing.  Prior to the MMA, generic companies often 
filed ANDA’s many years in advance.264  Generic drug companies 
were incentivized to do this under the Hatch-Waxman 
amendments, which essentially made the filing of ANDA’s with 
paragraph IV certifications a race to obtain the 180-day 
exclusivity, by rewarding only the first filer the exclusivity.265  
However, the new statute essentially holds that the exclusivity 
period will be forfeited within 30 months of the filing of the 
ANDA, unless there is a judicial finding of patent invalidity or 
noninfringement.266  Exceptions allowing an earlier filing that 
preserve exclusivity are very limited.  One possibility may be if a 
generic can successfully invalidate a main product patent in an 
infringement suit, which would avoid forfeiture events if the 
generic drug can be launched timely after a final court decision.267  
 263 See supra Part II (discussion of the forfeiture provisions). 
 264 See for example, the Ciprofloxacin discussion supra.  Barr Laboratories filed its 
ANDA to the ’444 patent, expiry December 2003, in October 1991, which was 12 years 
in advance. 
 265 Teva Pharm. Indust., Ltd. v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 (D.D.C. 2004); 
Pharmachemie B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 276 F.3d 627, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 266 See supra Part II (discussion of the forfeiture provisions). 
 267 In this scenario, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) or (II)(aa), will apply, and the 
ANDA will be approvable on the date of a court decision of invalidity or 
noninfringement, and forfeiture provision 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) applies, 
so a forfeiture event be triggered if the generic drug is not marketed within 75 days of the 
decision of a court from which no appeal can be taken. 
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Another exception may be if the generic company files a 
declaratory judgment action, which constitutes a legal action under 
the forfeiture statute and defers the trigger until the action is 
settled.268  Another exception may be if the generic company and 
NDA holder settle without a concession on the validity of the 
patent by the NDA holder, and without promise by the NDA 
holder to not sue the generic company.  This situation is essentially 
a grant of a license to use the patent that would otherwise be 
litigated, and does not trigger exclusivity under the forfeiture 
provision,269 since there would be no finding of patent invalidity or 
noninfringement.  There are pitfalls with the settlement option, 
such as the chance that a third party generic company will 
challenge the patent.270  Thus the MMA forfeiture events do not 
account for a legitimate paragraph III certification far in advance 
of the ANDA filing.  This situation threatens to take away from the 
generic companies many cases of exclusivity that would have been 
awarded under the pre-MMA statute. 
For example, as an illustration of the time lines under the new 
rules, consider the Teva case involving sertraline discussed 
supra.271  If the Ivax and Teva ANDA’s were originally filed 
under the AAPA provisions, Ivax would have forfeited its 
exclusivity because the product would not have been marketed 
within 30 months of the original filing,272 or within 75 days of the 
settlement granting the ’699 license.273  Therefore, under the 
AAPA regime, if a generic company had wished to file a paragraph 
IV certification against the ’699 patent, they could not have done 
so until December 31, 2003, 30 months prior to the expiry of the 
’699 patent on June 30, 2006.  If any generic company filed a 
 268 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb).  However, note that in this scenario the generic 
company has little control over the timing of the settlement of the case. 
 269 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(BB). 
 270 See infra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 271 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (Teva v. Pfizer II), 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 272 The exact date of the Ivax ANDA is not given in Teva v. Pfizer II, 395 F.3d at 1330; 
the date is only given as “1999.”  Thus, the latest possible 30-month date is June 30, 
2003.  The exclusivity based on the ’518 patent, which was not challenged by Ivax or 
Teva, expires June 30, 2006. Id. 
 273 The date of the Pfizer license to Ivax is only given as “2002.” Id. 
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paragraph IV certification earlier, then exclusivity would be 
forfeited for all generic companies.274
Alternatively, Pfizer could have provided a license to Ivax for 
the ’699 patent, which would not trigger the forfeiture 
provisions.275  However, this is not a fool proof alternative, 
because it does not prevent another company from challenging the 
’699 patent.  If a challenge was successful, that would have taken 
away Ivax’s exclusivity.276  In that case, Ivax would not have 
accrued the reward of the 180-day exclusivity period as an 
incentive for being the first to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV 
certification.  A later challenger would not get an exclusivity 
period either.  On the expiration of the ’699 patent, in this 
hypothetical, most likely multiple generic copies would be 
introduced simultaneously, causing very rapid price erosion.277  
While this may have short term benefits for consumers, it is 
damaging to the incentives for the generic drug industry. 
Another problem with the settlement and license hypothetical 
is that it puts too much control over the process in the hands of the 
innovator company.  A generic company approaching an innovator 
company for a license to circumvent the forfeiture provisions may 
have no indication of the innovator’s willingness to license later 
expiring patents, and also will have no idea of generic competitors’ 
activity affecting any agreement.  A generic company can thus 
make a substantial investment, and the innovator may simply 
 274 See 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I), stating that if a previous ANDA with a paragraph 
IV certification was filed, then the ANDA approval will be delayed 180 days.  If the 
exclusivity of the first ANDA filer is forfeited, then no company is entitled to any 
exclusivity. 
 275 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(BB).  See also supra note 269 and accompanying 
text. 
 276 The exclusivity would be extinguished in this scenario because the patent being 
challenged would be invalidated by a party other than the first applicant to file a 
paragraph IV certification, far in advance of the judicial decision.  Under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA), exclusivity is forfeited if the drug is not marketed within 75 
days of a decision of invalidity by a court from which no appeal can be taken, on a 
challenge by any party.  In this scenario, if the marketing date is constrained to a future 
time months or years after such a decision, exclusivity is destroyed. 
 277 See A. Maureen Rouhi, Generic Tide is Rising, 80 (38) Chemical and Engineering 
News 37-51 (2002), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/8038/8038 
biogenerics1.html (discussing the price erosion in innovator drugs once generics are 
introduced to the market). 
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refuse to deal.  Perhaps the refusal would be due to a prior generic 
company concluding a confidential licensing arrangement.  There 
could be any number of other reasons, rational or not.  Moreover, 
this concept invites ANDA applicants and innovator drug 
companies to make deals, which in the antitrust regime are 
horizontal market allocations but for the patent involved.  It was 
concern over just these kinds of deals, affecting the 180-day 
exclusivity, that led to the FTC investigations and the AAPA itself. 
Innovator companies could conceivably hold an auction, where 
exclusivity would be based on a factor other than the first party to 
develop the drug, which was the original intent of the Hatch-
Waxman amendments.278  Prior to the enactment of the forfeiture 
provisions, free market forces determined which company was first 
to market.  The FDA made public the existence of an ANDA with 
a paragraph IV certification, so a generic company would at least 
know prior to ANDA filing if they were not first to file.  With the 
forfeiture provisions, there is now a cloud over the whole process. 
The 180-day exclusivity period benefits the innovator 
companies too, by tempering the rapid price erosion that would 
otherwise occur if multiple generics entered the market 
simultaneously.279  This suggests that the innovator companies 
may have an incentive to work with the generic companies to 
maintain exclusivity periods,280 but it also can leave the generic 
companies subject to arbitrary or capricious choices by the 
innovators, rather than letting unbiased market forces determine 
the exclusivity period. 
Benefit or harm to the public is always an element of an 
antitrust analysis.281  The benefit to the public from the new 
forfeiture provisions, assuming exclusivity periods become rare, 
will only lie in the rapid price erosion once generics enter the 
 278 Supra note 265. 
 279 Supra note 277. 
 280 This statement may be obvious in light of the episodes discussed supra, such as 
Caridizem CD, Terazosin, Ciprofloxacin, etc., but the meaning here is that innovator 
companies have an interest in their generic rivals’ exclusivity periods even if there are no 
antitrust issues, such as anticompetitive dealing, in order to moderate price erosion after 
generic entry into the market. 
 281 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 50, at 12–13, discussing the importance of 
consumer welfare goals in antitrust analysis. 
BERKSFINALEDIT_091706_CLEAN 9/17/2006  5:41:05 PM 
1346 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1305 
 
market.282  Conversely, if generic and innovator companies rush 
into each others arms, the cooperation will tend to benefit larger 
generic companies, who can afford the legal resources and cost of 
license deals.  This could be interpreted as an anticompetitive 
effect, favoring only those generic companies with a substantial 
capital structure, not necessarily those that are more innovative.  
Innovation should be the appropriate determinative factor. 
If exclusivity periods become rare in the new regime, the 
forfeiture rules may tend to harm consumers by delaying the 
introduction of generic drugs, because the generic drug companies 
will have less incentive to innovate and file paragraph IV 
certifications without the benefit of the exclusivity period.  Thus, 
consumers may have to wait longer before they realize the benefits 
of the price erosion.  This delay may translate to a lengthened 
exclusivity of the brand name drugs. 
This situation seems to have taken away the original intent of 
the Hatch-Waxman statute to incentivize generic companies to file 
ANDA’s with paragraph IV certifications, because of the 
diminished prospects for exclusivity.  The legislative record of the 
forfeiture provisions indicates that Congress was concerned with 
collusion between the innovator and generic companies by 
delaying the commencement of the exclusivity.283  Although the 
Congressional record mentions no specific cases, it appears they 
had in mind situations like Cardizem CD or Terazosin, where there 
were agreements to delay the start of the exclusivity period, which 
in addition to perceived unfair profits to both the innovator and 
generic company, also delayed the introduction of other generic 
competitors, and was perceived to harm consumers.  However, the 
way the legislation turned out, important incentives for generic 
drug companies to innovate, by designing bioequivalent copies of 
known effective medications, and racing to file patent challenges 
and ANDA’s as soon as possible, have apparently been 
significantly harmed. 
In many cases, generic drugs are not simply copy cat versions 
of marketed products, but rather require significant investment and 
 282 Supra note 277. 
 283 149 CONG. REC. S15746 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2003). 
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development.  The potential damage to the generic drug industry 
threatens to harm consumers and reduce the diversity of business 
interests manufacturing drugs.  The potential misallocation of 
resources is antithetical to the goals of antitrust law.284  That is an 
undesirable outcome. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The AAPA provisions of the Medicare Modernization Act 
were promulgated largely in response to antitrust concerns around 
the original Hatch-Waxman amendments, particularly in the area 
of perceived abuses in the 30-month stay of effectiveness on the 
filing of a paragraph IV certification, and perceived harm from 
collusive agreements between innovator and generic companies, 
often involving horizontal territorial restraints and manipulations 
of the 180-day exclusivity period.  While in some respects, such as 
the limit in the AAPA amendments of a single 30-month stay per 
drug, the amendments seem to have leveled the playing field and 
provided benefits to both generic drug companies and consumers, 
while still being fair to innovator drug companies, in other 
respects, particularly the 180-day exclusivity forfeiture provisions, 
it seems that the new amendments will harm the generic and 
innovator drug companies substantially.  The trajectory of cases 
from Cardizem CD to Terazosin to Schering suggested that the 
courts had worked out a rational and predictable set of rules, 
essentially holding that agreements within the scope of patent 
rights are acceptable and not challengeable on antitrust grounds, 
and agreements outside that scope will incur antitrust liability.  It 
seems that Congress, in its implementation of the AAPA, may 
have misunderstood patent rights and incentives to innovate by 
coming down too hard with the forfeiture provisions that will 
disincentivize and harm the generic drug industry.  Generic drugs 
do not grow on trees, and in the end consumers will lose if either 
the innovator or generic drug industries are excessively harmed by 
the new statutes. 
 284 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 50, at 19. 
